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Abstract 
This paper assesses the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany. Using repeat 
cross-section and longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel, it indicates the 
overwhelming importance of behavioral as opposed to compositional change in this process. 
Further, in the first use of survival analysis for the purpose, it also charts workplace transitions 
into and out of collective bargaining. In addition to providing new estimates of the median 
duration of coverage, the paper reports on the factors generating entry into and exit from 
collective bargaining. These influences are found to be distinct but symmetric. 
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I.  Introduction 
Use of the characteristics of collective bargaining to help motivate analysis of wage and employment 
outcomes occupies an important position in contemporary treatments of the covariation of institutions and 
macroeconomic outcomes. Thus, notions of the importance of the centralization of collective bargaining 
(or its absence) to wage and unemployment development figured heavily in policy discussions in the 
1980s (Calmfors and Driffill, 1993). More recently, the importance of centralization has been 
supplemented if not supplanted by notions of coordination (e.g. OECD, 2004, Chapter 3). Vulgo: more 
centralized bargaining regimes – latterly, more coordinated ones – have been held out as offering scope 
for improved economic performance. 
One important issue that has arisen is the stability of the bargaining structure (and of that of 
labour institutions more generally) through time. At best, bargaining structures – centralized, 
decentralized, and/or coordinated – have been observed at a few points in time, and insufficient attention 
has been paid to within-country changes. This seems singularly inappropriate when industrial relations 
systems are evidently under sustained stress. At another level, most studies investigating time-varying 
changes in collective bargaining have with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Dustman, Ludsteck, and 
Schönberg, 2009) focused on union density. This strategy also seems inadequate given that union density 
and collective bargaining coverage are far from being perfectly correlated.  
In the present study we will focus on Germany, the exemplar of moderately centralized but well- 
coordinated industrial relations in continental Europe, and the interval 2000-2008. Despite its long-
standing reputation as a beacon of stability, however, the German case is also of particular interest given 
the recent signs of atrophy in its industrial relations architecture. Here we refer of course to the erosion of 
sectoral (i.e. industry-wide) collective bargaining.  
The four component parts of this paper should be seen as proceeding in tandem. First, we offer   
descriptive information on the hemorrhaging of collective bargaining. This material not only plays an 
important part in scene setting but also hints at the potential importance of certain variables (viz. 
establishment size and region) while providing some practical justification for our subsequent 
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concatenation of the categories of sectoral and firm-level bargaining into a single “any collective 
bargaining  composite.”  Second, a decomposition exercise, based on two cross sections of the data not 
only confirms an earlier result in the literature that the decline in collective bargaining cannot be 
attributed to changes in the make-up of the workforce or in establishment characteristics (see, in 
particular, Addison et al. 2011), but also introduces the full set of arguments to be used in the rest of our 
analysis. Importantly, it also establishes the case for treating establishment heterogeneity more directly. 
Third, our random effects treatment of collective bargaining propensity is grounded in this recognition, 
exploiting a longitudinal panel to explain why some establishments may be expected to be covered by 
collective agreements while others are likely to populate a zone free of collective bargaining. Besides 
addressing the role of the covariates, it also quantifies the inertia in collective bargaining status.  Finally, 
we turn to the factors that induce failure, examining transitions into or out of a collective agreement. Our 
survival modeling of collective bargaining takes the analysis of inertia and contract determination one 
crucial stage further. It is at once the major contribution of the paper and culmination of a lock-step 
treatment of change and persistence in the German model.   
The novelty of our approach stems from the fact that the panel we analyze is long enough to 
follow some establishments from the outset (i.e. from their birth) to the point of ‘failure’, here the year in 
which they switch collective bargaining regime. For these cases, we provide the first estimates of the 
median duration of coverage, as well as the main determinants of the decision to leave/join a collective 
agreement. A second innovation involves an analysis of the duration of coverage of panel stayers via the 
use of a simulated counterfactual. Panel stayers are all those establishments that are left-censored in 2000 
(i.e. those with unknown elapsed time of coverage in the year the establishment is first observed). 
 The use of a nine year observation window in this study is a significant departure from standard 
cross-section analyses and from panel studies that rely on two distinct moments in time (consecutive or 
not). Our approach proves fruitful in the sense that it allows us to tackle the determinants of coverage  (or 
absence of coverage) without assuming away unobserved establishment heterogeneity, while at the same 
time yielding estimates of the duration of different collective bargaining regimes. In the former case, we 
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can ultimately estimate the odds of being covered (uncovered) by collective bargaining at different 
moments in time. In the latter case, we can model the probability that a given establishment will switch 
out of (or into) a collective agreement given that it was covered (uncovered) up to certain point in time. 
Both aspects assist us in interpreting the ongoing decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany.  
 
II. Preliminaries: The Decline in Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation 
Recent studies have documented a shift in the locus of wage bargaining from industry-wide sectoral 
bargaining to lower levels, both firm-level collective agreements and, much more importantly of late, 
individual bargains or contracts between the worker and the firm (see Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a,b; 
Addison et al., 2010, 2011; Ellguth and Kohaut, 2010, 2011). There has also occurred a decentralization 
within sectoral agreements themselves, which development has stimulated a distinct debate as to whether 
the process is internally destabilizing or not (see, inter al., Hassel, 1999, 2002; Klikauer, 2002; Frege, 
2003; Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2009; Bispinnck et al., 2010). In any event, the 
decentralization of sectoral bargaining – occasioned by opening clauses and pacts for competitiveness 
(see, respectively, Schnabel and Kohaut, 2007; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005) – has inevitably 
narrowed the distinction between sectoral and firm-level collective agreements and may also have 
militated against further growth in the latter. Partly for this reason, once we have charted the course of all 
types of agreement in the descriptive part of the present exercise, we will subsequently collapse sectoral 
and firm-level collective bargaining into a single "any collective bargaining" composite for analytical 
purposes. But in so doing we do not wish to understate the importance of external erosion, namely the 
sustained increase in the percentage of establishments and employees not covered by any type of 
collective agreement. 
Since the data used in the present exercise differ in a small number of respects from those used in 
other studies,
1
 it is first necessary to provide information on this process of change in collective 
bargaining. (The Data Appendix succinctly describes our database.) The main trends over the years 2000-
2008 are charted in Table A.1 by employment and establishment coverage.  The most notable features of 
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the reported values are the decrease in sectoral bargaining and the rise of the collective bargaining free 
zone. Thus, the share of workers (establishments) covered by sectoral agreements has fallen by 9.5 (11.9) 
percentage points to 49.2 (36.4) percent, while the share of workers (establishments) without any 
collective bargaining has correspondingly grown by 8.5 (11.9) percentage points to 42.8 (60.8) percent. 
The decline in sectoral bargaining has occurred in both eastern and western Germany, even if the rate of 
decline in bargaining coverage has been more pronounced in the latter region. Interestingly, there has 
been very little change in firm-level bargaining in terms of establishment coverage, even if employment 
coverage has risen modestly in both parts of Germany and is higher in eastern Germany. 
Coverage rates by establishment size are contained in Table A.2. First, levels of sectoral 
bargaining are considerably higher in larger establishments (defined as those with 250 or more 
employees), where the collective bargaining free zone is also correspondingly smaller. Larger plants are 
also more likely to have firm-level collective agreements than their smaller counterparts, although the 
disparities here are very much smaller. In terms of trends, both size classes register declines in sectoral 
bargaining (proportionally larger among smaller establishments) and growth in absence of collective 
bargaining (somewhat greater among larger plants). Modest increases in firm-level bargaining are 
recorded for larger firms and even for smaller firms based on the employment coverage indicator, but just 
as in the aggregate case firm-level bargaining is dominated by sectoral bargaining.  
A further breakdown of the data by region reveals some differences, while confirming the broad 
differences between plants of different size and trends in sectoral agreements and no collective 
agreements. First, absence of collective bargaining is and has remained more important in eastern 
Germany even if the growth rates are proportionately smaller than in western Germany, especially among 
smaller establishments. Second, and conversely, sectoral bargaining coverage is lower among smaller and 
larger establishments in eastern Germany, although the decline has now been proportionately greater 
among larger east German establishments. Finally, firm-level bargaining is roughly twice as important in 
eastern Germany for both sizes of establishment than in westerm Germany and any recorded growth is 
also higher in the east although confined to larger establishments. 
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Next, if we take any two distinct cross-sections – say 2000 and 2008 – it is analytically 
straightforward to decompose the decline in collective bargaining coverage into its Oaxaca-Blinder 
components, namely the so-called ‘between’ or compositional effect and the ‘within’ or behavioural 
effect. The between effect, or the explained component, is that part of the observed change that can be 
attributed to differences in observable characteristics. The within effect, or unexplained component, 
measures the change in coverage arising from differences in propensities (or coefficients). More formally, 
let            be the 2008 (predicted) coverage based on year 2000 coefficients, where   denotes the 
mean vector of observed (establishment) characteristics and   indicates the vector of estimated 
coefficients in the corresponding year. The between effect is then given by                     and the 
within effect by                   , where  the reference groups are the year 2000 coefficients and the 
year 2008 characteristics, respectively.
2
 
Our selected vector of covariates   includes establishment size, the proportion of skilled and 
female workers, and dummies for single-establishment status, foreign ownership, establishment age, state 
of technology, industry, and region (see the Data Appendix for a fuller description as well as sections III 
and IV below). The broad rationale for their inclusion is to be found in for example Willman, Bryson, and 
Gomez’s (2007) modeling of employer voice-choice decisions. Based on the argument that firms face 
non-trivial switching costs (i.e. costs connected with uncertainty surrounding the benefits from moving 
from coverage to non-coverage, and vice-versa), one would expect the returns to being covered by 
collective agreements to be higher in large establishments and in plants integrated in multi-site 
establishments. Establishments with a higher proportion of low-skill employees are also likely to rely less 
on voice mechanisms and therefore expected to be associated with a lower presence of collective 
agreements. By the same token, older establishments are more likely to be covered given that the 
incidence of collective bargaining tended to be higher in the past. Alternatively, recently established 
businesses often require more flexible institutional arrangements at early stages of their existence (see 
Schnabel et al., 2006).   
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The results for the entire sample period for collective bargaining of any type are provided in panel 
(a) of Table A.3. Consistent with prior research, there is clear confirmation that the within effect is 
overwhelmingly dominant, accounting for more than 90 percent of the observed change in coverage. 
Interestingly, the dominance of the within effect is no less pronounced in eastern Germany where the 
decline in overall collective bargaining has been less acute than in western Germany. Panels (b) and (c) of 
the table repeat the decomposition exercise for the two sub-periods, 2000-2004 and 2005-2008, 
respectively. (The unemployment peak of 11.7 percent in 2005 provides the basis for the cutoff year.) As 
it is apparent, the within effect is also clearly dominant in both sub-periods. 
It is the precisely this limited role of observables found in decompositions based on the 2000 and 
2008 cross-sections that sets the stage for our subsequent longitudinal analysis of the propensity of a 
given establishment to be covered. Essentially, the large within effect we have estimated implies that one 
has to treat establishment heterogeneity more directly. With these preliminaries behind us, we now turn to 
a closer examination of this issue.  
 
III. Collective Bargaining Coverage Propensity 
Let Yit represent the coverage outcome for the t
th
 observation in the i
th 
establishment. Given the random 
effect iu which represents the establishment’s persistent unobserved traits, namely its unobserved 
propensity to be covered by a collective agreement, the random-effects probit model can be specified as 
        |                    ,       (1) 
where   is the standard cumulative distribution function and   |          
  . Model assumptions are 
therefore that    and     are independent and that    has a normal distribution.
3
    includes all observed 
establishment characteristics that have an impact on the binary response probability, and   denotes the set 
of parameters to be estimated.
4 
As before, the arguments are establishment size, the proportion of skilled 
and female workers, and dummies for single-establishment status, foreign ownership, establishment age, 
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state of technology, industry, and region. A full set of time (year) dummies is also included in the 
regression model. 
Conditional on         , outcomes Yi1, Yi2, …, YiT are independent, with probabilities depending 
on    and    . This means that, conditioning only on    , Yi1, Yi2, …, YiT will be dependent across t. A 
useful statistic therefore is the (latent) intra-class (establishment) correlation, given by     
    
    ⁄ , 
which indicates the relative importance of the unobserved effect    or the correlation between any two 
observations in the same establishment (see, for example, Rodríguez and Elo, 2003). We will also exploit 
an additional measure of (manifest) association based on the actual binary outcomes    , rather than on the 
latent variable    
 , namely Pearson’s r coefficient. The two measures –   and Pearson’s r – will therefore 
give the extent to which there is inertia in an establishment’s collective bargaining status. Along with 
these measures, we will also use other statistics (on which more below) evaluated with the linear predictor 
set at various percentiles, the goal being to have different measures of the persistence of collective 
bargaining status. 
The analysis of collective bargaining coverage propensity by type of collective agreement is 
presented in Table 1. We retain in the sample all plants surveyed in the 2000-2008 observation window, 
including those that changed their collective bargaining status more than once. As a practical matter, 
however, dropping the latter establishments produced virtually no change in the results. From Table 1 it 
can be seen that establishment size and establishment age are positively and single-establishment firm 
status negatively associated with coverage. This propensity is also increasing in the skill composition of 
the workforce. With a few exceptions, the industry and region dummies are also statistically significant. 
However, other than the lower propensity of establishments located in east German Länder to be covered 
by a collective agreement (not shown in the table), there are no obvious patterns in the data in this regard.  
 (Table 1 near here) 
Running our random-effects probit separately for the two halves of Germany indicates the 
consistent influences of establishment size and age, proportion of skilled workers, and single-
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establishment firm status on propensity to be covered. However, the role of foreign ownership in 
promoting coverage clearly reflects the situation in eastern Germany, while the negative but statistically 
insignificant influence of workforce proportion female found for Germany as a whole masks the 
marginally significant effect of that argument for western Germany.  
Of interest is the high value of   –  the intra-class (establishment) correlation defined above – 
which at 0.93 indicates considerable inertia in collective bargaining status. In short, there is strong 
evidence that, after controlling for the   , the probabilities of an establishment being covered in any t0 and 
t1 are highly correlated. (The presence of non-trivial switching costs, referred to earlier, may of course lie 
at the root of this outcome.) Equivalently, the magnitude of    (at 3.71) implies that a small difference in 
unobserved traits entails a quite different propensity of being covered by a collective agreement. Also 
note that since the significance test for   is itself a test for the presence of the unobserved effect (     if 
and only if   
    , we can reject the simple pooled probit as an appropriate model description of the 
data. 
(Table 2 near here) 
The manifest intra-class correlation across distinct percentiles is given in Table 2.
5
 Let us  focus 
on the median percentile. Thus, setting the linear predictor at the median (the 0.50 column), the intra-class 
correlation is 0.76, flagging substantive within group persistence. Note also that for the median percentile, 
the corresponding  joint probability in the second row (i.e. the probability of being covered in two given 
years) is equal to 0.47. In turn, the corresponding marginal probability of being covered by any type of 
agreement in any given year is 0.53 (first row), which closely tracks the (unweighted) mean coverage rate 
observed in the sample, at 52.7 percent.
6
  Finally, the odds ratio in the fourth row indicates that the odds 
of an establishment being covered in t0 and t1 versus not being covered in t0 but covered in t1 are 56.2 
times higher for the same observed characteristics. Since the odds ratio contrasts the (same) behaviour of 
two establishments in t1, given that in t0 they may have behaved differently, the conclusion is that it is 
considerably more likely that establishments that are covered will stay covered than non-covered 
establishments will join. Inertia in non-coverage is therefore very strong as well.  
  
9 
A glance at the full range of results presented in Table 2 reveals that the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 
percentiles imply both a Pearson’s r and an odds ratio that are very close to each other, while the marginal 
probability and the joint probability statistics exhibit a greater degree of variability. Interestingly, using 
Pearson’s r, the 0.01 and the 0.99 percentiles show approximately the same degree of inertia in collective 
bargaining status, while the two very high odds ratios show that it is a considerably more likely that 
establishments in these two groups will stay covered in any two periods than join a collective agreement 
of any type. 
Finally, by squaring the Pearson’s r coefficient (at the median percentile), we obtain the result 
that collective bargaining coverage in a given year explains about 58 percent of the variation in collective 
bargaining behaviour in another year. The inference is that there is no terminal inertia in collective 
bargaining status, which result offers more than sufficient justification for an analysis of transitions into 
and out of collective bargaining. 
 
IV. Transitions and Collective Bargaining ‘Survivability’ 
We have seen that certain characteristics are associated with collective bargaining coverage. But can we 
say that the longer lasting its coverage, the less likely an establishment will be to change bargaining 
status? Our concern is now with the specific factors that induce failure, that is, transitions into or out of a 
collective agreement. The proper context for such analysis is survival modeling. 
In our observation window, we have a maximum of nine annual observations which is 
insufficient to allow us to follow all production units from outset (birth) to death. The typical unit in our 
panel is indeed one that was born before 2000 and surveyed over a certain number of years within the 
observation interval. Figure 1 illustrates the array of possibilities. Establishment A, for example, was born 
before 2000 and is observed consecutively from 2000 up to point e (exit from a given state or point of 
‘failure’).7 Establishment A has therefore a left-truncation point as it is not possible to recover its 
bargaining status prior to 2000. Establishment B, on the other hand, is not only left-truncated but also 
right censored as well since it rotates out of the panel at point c. For their part, establishments C, D and E 
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are observed for a number of years up to (a) ‘failure’, (b) attrition, and (c) right censoring (in 2008), 
respectively. Establishments F and G were born after 2000 and are, respectively, right censored and 
exiting a given state before 2008. Finally, there are those ‘permanent’ establishments, represented by case 
H, which are both left- and right-censored (in 2000 and 2008, respectively). In general, we will not be 
able to know the exact length of all spells because it is simply not possible to recover the ‘missing’ 
information. On the other hand, newly-founded establishments – and, to some extent, permanent 
establishments (i.e. panel stayers) – are a special case and they will be used to explain the survivability of 
collective bargaining. Again in the interests of expositional convenience, we focus on the aggregate 
category of collective agreements of any type. 
(Figure 1 near here) 
In the limit, the probability of failure, given by the hazard function, is constant and independent 
of any establishment attribute. This case is not particularly helpful in the present context since we believe 
that the selected covariates do have an impact on the hazard rate. Thus, we assume that leaving (or 
joining) a collective agreement of any type is a function of an observed set of time-constant (e.g. industry 
dummies) and time-varying (e.g. establishment size) covariates.
8
 
Our hazard function belongs to the family of proportional hazards (PH) models 
                  ,          (2) 
where    and    are the same functions for all establishments and   is the vector of the selected 
covariates (see, for example,  Lancaster, 1990, Chapter 3). Setting            , and              , 
we have the standard Cox proportional hazards model 
                    ,         (3) 
where       is the baseline hazard (or the hazard rate when all covariates are set at zero).
9
 Thus,      
denotes, for covered (uncovered) establishments, the probability of an establishment leaving (joining) a 
collective agreement of any type, given that it has been covered (uncovered) up to time t. Given the 
longitudinal nature of our dataset, the standard errors of the estimated hazard coefficients are adjusted to 
account for the possible intra-group (establishment) correlation. 
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We also used parametric methods so that we can compare (a) PH estimates from both parametric 
(Weibull) and semiparametric (Cox) models, and (b) parametric estimates across a variety of models 
(Weibull, log-normal, and log-logistic).
10
 Typically, and again omitting the subscript denoting the 
individual (establishment), a parametric model is written (in accelerated failure-time form) as      
    , with      denoting the logarithm of the survival time, and   the error term. z can assume 
different distributional forms, determining the regression model. 
As mentioned earlier, we have both stock and flow sampling in our data, in the sense that we are 
able to observe entrants (newly-founded establishments) and non-entrants (i.e. establishments born at 
some point in the pre-observation period.
11
 In the case of non-entrants, for whom left-censoring is the key 
problem, some further data manipulation will be required. For entrants, the survival analysis is 
straighforward since all spells for these units are either complete or right censored. In this context, the 
subsample of births turns out to be extremely useful, and we will discuss below the extent to which 
inferences based on births  can be carried forward, first, to the subset of permanent establishments and 
then to the entire sample of surveyed units. 
(Table 3 near here) 
As shown in Table 3, we observe 2,679 births in the 1999-2006 period (plus 504 births in 2007 
that are only observed once, namely in 2008). Of the total number of births, there are 266 collective 
agreement transitions in the 2001-2008 interval, comprising 149 leavers and 117 joiners. In other words, 
9.9 percent of all births either switched into or out of a collective agreement during the sample period. 
Table 3 also gives the collective agreement status in the year of birth and in the year of exit for all 
births in the sample, as well as the average year of exit (i.e. either rotation out of the panel due to attrition 
or transition into a different state) for each cohort. For example, an establishment born in 1999 is 
observed over an average period of 2.6 years before switching to a different regime or leaving the panel. 
Interestingly, the expected year of exit for our sample is virtually the same for covered and uncovered 
establishments. In any event, for establishments born later in the period, the average number of years 
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prior to exit is necessarily smaller given that their number of years in the observation window becomes 
shorter. 
From the total number of births in our dataset, and ignoring the 2007 cohort for which no 
transitions can be observed, in 52.2 percent of the cases establishments remain uncovered and 37.9 
percent remain covered. This implies, as we have seen, that in 9.9 percent [100-(52.2+37.9)] of the cases 
we do observe establishments changing – either leaving or joining – their collective agreement status. Of 
those plants that are covered in the year of birth (plus one), some 12.8 percent do switch out of collective 
agreement within the observation window, while 7.7 percent of their non-covered counterparts will join a 
collective agreement. (Multiple failures – establishments with more than one transition over the 
observation period – are now dropped from our sample.)12 
 The results of model (2) – the hazard function – are presented in Table 4 for the two possible 
failure events: leaving a collective agreement or joining one. And in the last row of the table is given the 
median duration of “coverage/uncoverage”, based on a PH exponential model without covariates. 
According to our estimates, the median duration of coverage for newly-founded establishments is 1.81 
years, while the median duration without coverage is 2.61 years.  
(Tables 4 and 4A near here) 
As for the role of the selected covariates, greater establishment size decreases the probability of 
leaving a collective agreement, as does the use of modern technology. In contrast, foreign ownership and 
single-establishment status are associated with a higher failure rate. Note that the role of single-
establishment status and foreign-owned variables are particularly strong; in particular, being a single 
establishment implies an 83 percent higher hazard rate, while foreign-ownership increases the hazard by 
58 percent. In turn, a 1 percent increase in establishment size reduces the hazard by 0.35 percent. All 
other covariates included in the regression are not statistically significant. 
The results for joining a collective agreement of any sort (given in the second column of Table 4) 
look symmetric. In particular, whereas the probability of leaving a collective agreement is found in the 
first column of the table to be decreasing in employment size, it is increasing in employment size when it 
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comes to joining an agreement. But no other covariate is found to be statistically significant. Vulgo: 
establishment size is the major determinant of joining a collective agreement. That the evidence is much 
weaker in the case of transitions into collective agreements is not altogether unexpected given the smaller 
number of establishments engaging in such switching behaviour. 
 As shown in the penultimate row of Table 4, we do not find any evidence that the PH assumption 
has been violated, either in the case of leavers (first column of the table) or joiners (second column). For 
completeness, however, we also provide in Table 4A both the (PH) Weibull estimates and the non-PH 
parametric estimates from the log-normal and log-logistic models. First of all, observe that the median 
duration calculation from assuming a Weibull distribution rather than the exponential case is practically 
unchanged (cf. 1.81 in Table 4 with 1.89 in Table 4A in the case of leavers, and 2.61 in Table 4 with 2.58 
in Table 4A for joiners). Second of all, by multiplying the Weibull coefficient in AFT form (see the first 
and second columns of Table 4A) by the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, p, we obtain the 
corresponding Cox model coefficient. The comparison is quite striking in that (a) the sign of each 
coefficient is exactly the same, (b) their statistical significance is virtually unchanged, and (c) their 
magnitude is very close – striking but not surprising, as we did not reject the PH assumption in Table 4. 
Table 4A also presents the results from two other parametric implementations, namely the log-
normal and the log-logistic cases. Here we have to compare across the first, third and fifth columns, on 
the one hand, and across the second, fourth and sixth columns on the other. Again the results are very 
reassuring, in terms of the signs, statistical significance, and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients. 
Given these results, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), reported in the table, does not vary much 
across the selected alternatives, with the log-normal case giving the best fit (the smaller is the AIC value, 
the better). 
It will be recalled that in our observation window all units are left-censored except for newly-
founded plants. Since we cannot recoup the entire record of participation in collective bargaining for the 
former units, we can either ignore all transitions other than those observed for births or, alternatively, we 
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can try to figure out an alternative procedure that avoids losing the valuable transition information we 
have on other types of establishments.  
We elected to follow the second route, and therefore create a pre-observation period in which 
collective agreement status is unchanged for all units included in the risk analysis. To this end, we (a) 
divide the 2000-2008 period into the two sub-periods 2000-2003 and 2004-2008, (b) use the set of 
permanent establishments since these units are observed for a reasonably long time interval, and (c) 
impose the additional restriction of no change in status between 2000 and  2003. Transitions in the 2004-
2008 interval will then be used to estimate the hazard. We will refer to this sample as the “restricted 
sample of permanent establishments”. (Note that in enlarging the ‘pre-observation’ period from 2000-
2003 to 2000-2004, for example, we reduced the risk period with no appreciable change in the results, 
other than a slight decrease in significance levels.) 
In a second stage, and to test the role of left-censoring in our results – and ultimately evaluate 
whether the use of left-censored data in our survival analysis is legitimate – we added to the restricted 
sample of permanent establishments all those units in which collective bargaining status prior to 2004 is 
not fixed.
13
 Taking, for example, the case of covered establishments this counterfactual exercise serves to 
compare the results from an experiment in which the left-censored units are necessarily covered with the 
case in which the presumed fixed coverage prior to 2004 is false for some units – and similarly for the 
case where the initial state is non-coverage. If the determinants of the hazard rate in the two 
counterfactual experiments are not too different (that is, where the hazard is not too sensitive to changes 
in the selected samples), we may conclude that left-censoring for permanent units of the panel is not 
really an issue, and that running the survival analysis on an unrestricted set of permanent establishments 
is not too much of a stretch. In this vein, our third and final exercise applies the survival model to all 
permanent establishments observed in 2000-2008 period, without further restrictions. Again, in this case 
we are simply ignoring left-censoring, implicitly assuming that either there was no change in status in the 
past (i.e. before 2000) or, alternatively, that it occurred too long ago to be a matter of concern. 
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We have 1,448 establishments in the restricted estimation sample of permanent establishments, of 
which 821 (627) were covered (uncovered) over 2000-2003. Of those that were covered (in 2000-2003), 
93 subsequently switched out of collective bargaining between 2004 and 2008 – 93 out of 821 cases, or 
11 percent. Of those that were not covered, 35 switched into collective agreements after 2003 – 35 out of 
627 cases, or 6 percent. 
The corresponding survival analysis, shown in the first column of Table 5, again indicates that 
establishment size is critical: the larger the establishment, the lower the probability that a covered 
establishment will leave a collective agreement. The single establishment variable is also statistically 
significant and positively signed as expected. The remaining variables are statistically insignificant. In 
turn, as shown in the second column of the table, joining collective agreements is less common among 
permanent stayers than among newly-founded establishments. Not surprisingly, therefore, all variables in 
the second column are statistically insignificant, with the sole exception of the establishment age dummy. 
In this case, older establishments tend to have a lower exit rate (from non-coverage). Apparently, non-
covered establishments tend to stay non-covered, while the considerable minority that join collective 
agreements do not seem to share any readily discernible characteristics.  
(Table 5 near here) 
The second experiment – the counterfactual – is reproduced in Table 6. In this exercise, we added 
some 47 establishments to the sample in the first column of Table 5. The results are basically unchanged. 
The same obtains with respect to the transition behaviour of initially uncovered establishments, shown in 
the second column, where some 100 establishments have been added to the sample. The main lesson from 
the counterfactual is, then, that within the subsample of permanent establishments there seems to be no 
particular penalty in ignoring left-censoring. 
(Tables 6 and 7 near here) 
Given these findings, the final step is to present the survival analysis for the full set of permanent 
establishments. This procedure yields an enlarged estimation sample of 1,597 units, surveyed 
consecutively from 2000 to 2008. Of this total, there are 922 (675) establishments that were covered (not 
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covered) by any type of collective agreement in 2000, and some 275 transitions comprising 193 leavers 
and 82 joiners. The results are presented in Table 7. As expected, the findings reported in the table mimic 
those obtained earlier in Table 5. From this perspective, it appears legitimate to conclude that in the case 
of permanent panel members there is enough evidence to support the proposition that plant size and skill 
content of the workforce matter in terms of collective bargaining survivability, while single establishment 
status favours the abandonment of collective bargaining. The influence of the remaining covariates on 
survivability of collective agreements is statistically weak, with the exception of the establishment age 
variable. However, it is more difficult to discern equally strong patterns in respect of transitions into 
collective agreements. Here, size and, to some limited extent, foreign ownership are the unique 
determinants, with again strikingly symmetric effects.   
Finally, although the PH test rejects the null in only one case (viz. leaving any type of collective 
agreement, shown in the first column of Table 7), we also ran the corresponding parametric models for all 
cases contained in Tables 5 through 7. The results are not reported here but are available from the authors 
upon request. The principal findings are twofold. First, in both sign and statistical significance, the 
estimated coefficients are practically unchanged vis-à-vis those shown in Tables 5 through 7 – even in the 
case where the PH test rejected the null. Second, although the differences across the three parametric 
models are minor, the log-normal model offers the best fit.  
 
V. Conclusions  
We obtain confirmation in this study of the steady decline of sectoral bargaining in one of its hitherto 
more entrenched country settings. We can also confirm that the main source of the observed decline is 
attributable to (unexplained) establishment behaviour, holding establishment characteristics constant, 
rather than to any particularly unfavourable changes in observed characteristics. 
More importantly, the analysis of the determinants of collective bargaining membership is in 
accordance with some of not all of our priors; that is, the skill content of the workforce, and the age and 
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size of the establishment increase the propensity to be covered, while single-establishement status 
decreases it. 
 But we have also detected strong inertia in collective bargaining status, having controlled for 
establishment characteristics. This result is not unexpected given the long lasting presence of industry-
wide agreeements in Germany. Specifically, we estimate that the odds of an establishment being covered 
in two different years, say  t0 and t1, versus not being covered in t0 but covered in t1 are more than 50 
times higher for the same observed characteristics. 
Nevertheless, despite this observed persistence in collective agreements (and, equivalently, in 
their absence), establishments do switch their collective bargaining status. In this context, the finding that 
coverage (and absence of coverage) has a short half-life in the case of newly-founded establishments is of 
particular importance as it proves that collective bargaining is also volatile. Moreover, the finding that the 
estimated duration of coverage is shorter than the duration of no coverage, for this sample of 
establishments, also provides an interesting explanation for the observed decline in collective bargaining 
over the sample period. 
Finally, the results from the survival analysis on the subset of left-censored permanent 
establishments show that the factors governing the decision to leave/join are after all general and not 
specific to any subset of establishments. Expressed another way, plant size and skill content matter in the 
decision to join, while single-plant establishments with outdated technology may be those opting out of 
collective agreeements.  
The present treatment offers for the first time estimates of the median duration of coverage for 
newly-founded establishments. Further, using a set of counterfactual exercises, it is also shown that the 
determinants of collective bargaining transitions can be comfortably generalized to all types of 
establishments, both new and old. Our results are moreover robust to a variety of specifications. At root 
they suggest that, whatever position is taken on the current state of the German model, there is sufficient 
across-the-board variability in establishment behavior to indicate no lack of vitality. 
  
  
18 
Endnotes  
1. In particular, we used a more restrictive definition of not-for-profit organizations while at the same 
time imputing collective bargaining status in all cases where one-year status changes likely reflected 
coding error (see the Data Appendix). A more restrictive definition of not-for-profit organizations means 
that we dropped not only public corporations from the sample but also those establishments that reported 
a “total budget” rather than sales volume. On net, these innovations resulted in a slightly larger sample; 
specifically, an additional 5,000 observations. 
 
2. A different choice of reference groups would yield                    and                    for 
the between and within effects, respectively. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of the reference 
groups. 
 
3. Unfortunately, not imposing these restrictions on the relationship between    and    , in the spirit of 
the fixed-effects analysis, is infeasible due to the incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002: 
484). We cannot therefore offer any fixed-effects versus random-effects test. As it will be shown below, 
we can easily reject the null of no presence of the unobserved effect,   . This finding is the reason why 
we do not provide any results based on a simple pooled probit specification. Finally, relaxing the random-
effects model assumptions is a complex issue that is beyond the scope of the present paper the main goal 
of which is to provide indicative estimates of the propensity to be covered by a collective agreement. 
 
4. The equivalent latent variable model is given by    
              where    
  is the latent variable 
and           , with     uncorrelated with   . Assuming         |              
   |       , 
model (1) follows readily. 
 
5. We cannot perform a similar exercise for ρ since it does not depend on the marginal distribution. 
 
6. 52 percent is the unweighted average coverage rate in the estimation sample. According to Table A.3, 
the weighted average is necessarily lower than 51.2 percent as the coverage rate is roughly monotonically 
decreasing over the 2000-2008 period. The difference between weigthed and non-weigthed averages has 
to do with the well-known over-representation of large firms in the IAB survey. 
 
7. We note that by ‘failure’ we mean an exit from a given collective bargaining state, not an exit from the 
market (death). All establishment deaths were excluded from the panel. 
 
8. For the time-varying covariates, we shall ignore possible anticipation and delay effects. We shall also 
assume that the effect of any continuous variable on the hazard is independent of the level of the variable 
(i.e. the marginal effect is constant). A model without covariates will be used to obtain the predicted 
median duration of coverage/absence of coverage for newly-founded establishments (see last row of 
Table 4). 
 
9. Formally, the model in equation (3) is PH with time-invariant covariates. The corresponding PH model 
with time-varying variables is given by                         
(see Wooldridge, 2002: 693). 
 
10. The generalized gamma model did not achieve convergence in our implementation. Since the number 
of transitions is limited in our dataset and the set of selected covariates includes a number of dummy 
variables, this result is not overly surprising. We eschewed reducing the set of regressors in order to 
achieve convergence of the generalized gamma given the need to work a uniform set of covariates 
throughout the paper.  
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11. The year of birth of any establishment in the panel is always known. Only the bargaining status in the 
pre-observation period is unknown. 
 
 
12. The number of multiple failures in the sample of births is 195, out of 2,874 cases (or 6.8 percent). Of 
all these multiple failures, 76 percent record more than two switches, which we regard as indicative of 
bad measurement. Accordingly, all multiple failures were excluded from our regressions. We should 
further note that transitions are even less frequent among permanent establishments (cf. Tables 5 through 
7) and therefore for this subsample multiple collective bargaining changes are a matter of still less 
concern. 
 
13. For transitions into collective agreements, this amounts to adding the following sequences to the 
existing restricted sample of permanents: 0111|11111, 0011|11111, 0001|11111, and 0000|11111. In the 
case of transitions out of collective agreements, we add the sequences 1111|00000, 1110|00000, 
1100|00000, and 1000|00000. The vertical bar in these sequences denotes the 2003 separation point and 
‘1’ (‘0’) signifies coverage (absence of coverage or ‘uncoverage’). The 2004-2008 interval defines the 
risk period. 
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Data Appendix   
Our data is extracted from the IAB Establishment Panel (or Betriebspanel), which is based on a stratified 
random sample of plants from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by 
social insurance. A full description of the Betriebspanel is provided by Fischer et al. (2009). We confine 
our remarks here to outlining the procedures used to generate our various estimation samples. 
Firstly, we took the 2008 survey and appended to it all previous surveys back to 2000. We 
decided not to range further back in time primarily to avoid having to deal with changes in industry 
classification in 2000 (from a 3- to a 5-digit system), while extending the sample beyond 2008 would also 
require further manipulation of the data as industries were again reclassified in 2009. Secondly, we focus 
on establishments from the private, profit-oriented sector of the economy with at least 5 employees. 
Smaller establishments were excised on pragmatic grounds: they typically evince more spurious volatility 
in collective bargaining coverage. In total, we have 9 surveys (from 2000 through 2008), encompassing 
some 82,000 observations on approximately 24,000 establishments in the whole of Germany. We note 
that our criteria for excluding not-for-profit organizations implied that all public-sector units were 
excluded from the sample, as well as all those institutions that failed to report some sales volume. 
The constructed longitudinal dataset (i.e. the panel in which establishments are followed over 
time for a maximum period of nine years) is used to analyze collective bargaining membership, on the 
one hand, and the duration of collective agreements, on the other. Note that in general we do not know the 
elapsed duration of the observed spells. That is to say, we do not know the number of years in which a 
given establishment has been either covered or uncovered at the point it is first observed in the survey. All 
establishments are therefore left-truncated, with the notable exception of the newly-founded 
establishments (i.e. births) that we were able to follow from the outset. To ensure that the year of birth 
coded in the survey panel was correct, we used the establishment register (or Betriebsdatei) and the fact 
that establishments in the two raw datasets (i.e. Betriebsdatei and Betriebspanel) share exactly the same 
identification code (or Betriebsnummer). Finally, in coding the collective agreement variable, we assumed 
that if the status in year t-1 was the same as in year t+1, then the status in year t was unchanged. This 
assumption resulted in 3.3 percent of all collective agreement observations being recoded. 
 The selected covariates are presented in the table below. They comprise two measures of 
workforce composition based on skill and gender, foreign ownership, single establishment versus multi-
site firm status, establishment age, establishment size, and an indicator of the state of technology in use. 
The latter is a dummy equal to 1 if the technology of equipment is high or very high, 0 otherwise. (Note 
that since the technology question was not asked in 2004 we used the mean of 2003 and 2004 scores to 
complete the series.) These arguments are augmented by a total of thirty seven 2-digit industry dummies 
plus sixteen regional dummies. Although somewhat sparse, our choice of regressors is guided by the 
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literature and the need to minimize the loss of establishments occasioned by missing observations, 
especially in a situation where the number of collective agreement transitions is limited. 
 
   
 
Variable 
 Full sample Births 
Mean n Mean n 
Any type of collective agreement Dummy 0.527     82,137 0.435     8,158 
Sectoral agreement Dummy 0.458     82,137 0.369     8,158 
Firm-level agreement Dummy 0.069     82,137 0.067     8,158 
Log number of employees Continuous 3.685     82,137 3.240      8,158 
Use of modern technology Dummy 0.693     80,146 0.707     7,641 
Proportion of skilled workers Percent  67.36     82,118 65.13     8,156 
Proportion of female workers Percent 37.85     82,004 39.88     8,150 
Foreign majority ownership  Dummy  0.072     80,715 0.079      8,027 
Single establishment Dummy 0.713     81,400 0.692     8,087 
Establishment older than 10 years Dummy 0.650     81,769   
Regional dummies (16) Dummy  82,137  8,158 
Industry dummies (37) Dummy  82,137  8,158 
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TABLE 1 
Coverage Propensity by Type of Collective Agreement, Random-Effects Probit Estimates, 2000-
2008. 
  Germany  West East 
Log number of employees  0.977*** 
(0.021) 
 1.008*** 
(0.029) 
 0.925*** 
(0.034) 
Use of modern technology  0.019 
(0.030) 
 0.010 
(0.040) 
 0.037 
(0.046) 
Proportion of skilled workers   0.004***  
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.0008) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Proportion of female workers -0.001  
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
Foreign majority ownership  0.155*  
(0.085) 
 0.018 
(0.102) 
 0.452*** 
(0.156) 
Single establishment -0.643***  
(0.045) 
-0.480*** 
(0.058) 
-0.883*** 
(0.074) 
Establishment older than 10 years  1.176***  
(0.068) 
 1.127*** 
(0.091) 
 1.073*** 
(0.097) 
Regional dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes  Yes  Yes 
     3.714 (0.051) 3.858 (0.067) 3.389 (0.077) 
 
 
 0.932 (0.002) 0.937 (0.002) 0.920 (0.003) 
Wald    
 
7595.08 4264.23 2546.80 
Number of observations 80,958 50,895 30,063 
Number of establishments 24,018 16,187 7,835 
Notes: The model is given by equation (1) in the text.     is the standard deviation of the unobserved effect   , and   
is the latent intra-group (establishment) correlation. The model specification in the first column also contains 16 
regional dummies (10 and 6 for western and eastern Germany in the second and third columns of the table, 
respectively), 37 two-digit industry dummies, and 8 year dummies. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
25 
TABLE 2 
Marginal and Joint Coverage Probabilities and Intra-class Manifest Correlation 
  
Germany  
 Percentiles 
0.01 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.99 
Marginal probability 0.047 0.340 0.526 0.715 0.965 
Joint probability 0.032 0.286 0.467 0.665 0.954 
Pearson's r 0.681 0.759 0.764 0.755 0.668 
Odds ratio 152.118 59.430 56.248 62.534 182.264 
West  
Marginal probability 
0.049 0.435 0.627 0.789 0.973 
Joint probability 
0.035 0.379 0.573 0.748 0.965 
Pearson's r 
0.694 0.772 0.770 0.754 0.668 
Odds ratio 
160.996 61.485 63.083 75.693 235.672 
East  
Marginal probability 
0.059 0.229 0.369 0.538 0.895 
Joint probability 
0.040 0.180 0.308 0.474 0.866 
Pearson's r 
0.665 0.725 0.740 0.743 0.692 
Odds ratio 
107.931 55.406 47.896 46.309 78.754 
Notes: The reported statistics are obtained using the xtrho command in Stata 10, and are described in Rodriguez and 
Elo (2003). The 95% confidence intervals for the median percentile and for Germany, for example, are (0.526, 
0.527), (0.467, 0.468), (0.758, 0.770), and (52.681, 59.098), respectively. See section III for definitions. 
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TABLE 3 
Beginning- and End-period Collective Agreement Status of Newly-founded 
Establishments, 2000-2008, Unweighted Data 
 
Year of birth 
Collective agreement status in year 
of birth+1 
Collective agreement status in 
year of exit 
Year of exit  
(average) 
Status n Anycb=0 Anycb=1 
 
1999 
Anycb=0 150 132 18 2002.6 
Anycb=1 124 19 105 2002.6 
Total 274 151 123 2002.6 
 
2000 
Anycb=0 138 129 9 2003.1 
Anycb=1 118 17 101 2003.4 
Total 256 146 110 2003.2 
 
2001 
Anycb=0 172 159 13 2004.3 
Anycb=1 112 11 101 2004.1 
Total 284 170 114 2004.2 
 
2002 
Anycb=0 68 64 4 2005.1 
Anycb=1 38 6 32 2005.9 
Total 106 70 36 2005.4 
 
2003 
Anycb=0 253 231 22 2006.0 
Anycb=1 198 20 178 2006.0 
Total 451 251 200 2006.0 
 
2004 
Anycb=0 203 185 18 2006.7 
Anycb=1 195 37 158 2006.7 
Total 398 222 176 2006.7 
 
2005 
Anycb=0 241 230 11 2007.3 
Anycb=1 178 17 161 2007.3 
Total 419 247 172 2007.3 
 
2006 
Anycb=0 290 268 22 2007.7 
Anycb=1 201 22 179 2007.7 
Total 491 290 201 2007.7 
 
2007 
Anycb=0 278    
Anycb=1 226    
Total 504    
Notes: A newly-founded establishment in the 2000 (2001, …, 2008) survey is a unit born in 1999 (2000, …, 
2007). Consequently, all year 2008 births (i.e. establishments born in 2008) are discarded in our subsequent 
survival analysis. Also note that all establishments born in, say, 2002 but not observed (surveyed) before 2006, for 
example, are dropped from the sample. In other words, only those establishments that can be followed from the 
outset (year of birth) are included in the estimation sample. Exit means rotation out of the panel due either to 
attrition or failure (end of the initial state). Anycb is a dummy variable signifying the presence of any type of 
agreement. 
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TABLE 4 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimates, Newly-founded Establishments, 2000-2008 
 Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
Log number of employees -0.348 (0.068)***  0.349 (0.092)*** 
Use of modern technology -0.500 (0.157)***  0.011 (0.203) 
Proportion of skilled workers -0.004 (0.003)  0.002 (0.004) 
Proportion of female workers -0.007 (0.004)*  0.001 (0.004) 
Foreign majority ownership  0.460 (0.273)* -0.490 (0.449) 
Single establishment  0.604 (0.215)*** -0.032 (0.245) 
   
Number of observations  1,787  2,362 
Number of establishments  787  1,003 
Number of failures  145  117 
Wald     81.47  73.91 
PH test (  )  12.07  15.24 
   
Predicted median duration 1.81 2.61 
Notes: The hazard function is given by equation (2). The model includes 7 industry dummies and 1 regional dummy 
(western Germany). Clustered standard errors are given in parentheses. The Wald test rejects the null of no joint 
statistical significance of the model at the .01 level. The PH test, based on the Schoenfeld residuals, examines 
whether the proportional hazards (PH) assumption holds for the selected set of covariates. In neither column is there 
evidence that the PH assumption has been violated. The (predicted) median duration in the last row of the table is 
obtained using a PH exponential model without covariates. 
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TABLE 4A 
Parametric Model Estimates, Newly-founded Establishments, 2000-2008  
 Weibull Log-normal Log-logistic 
Leaving Joining Leaving Joining Leaving Joining 
Log number of 
employees 
 0.256*** 
(0.050)      
-0.211*** 
(0.058)     
0.206*** 
(0.040) 
-0.156*** 
 (0.049)     
0.229***    
(0.045)      
-0.195***     
(0.053)     
Use of modern 
technology 
 0.420*** 
(0.117)       
-0.009 
 (0.124)     
0.348*** 
(0.096)      
-0.003    
(0.106)    
0.394***    
(0.105)      
0.006   
(0.118)      
Proportion of 
skilled workers 
0.004* 
(0.002)       
-0.0006    
(0.002)     
0.004** 
(0.002)      
-0.0006   
(0.002)     
0.004**    
(0.002)      
-0.0009   
(0.002)     
Proportion of 
female workers 
0.006* 
(0.003)       
-0.0005   
(0.003)     
0.004* 
(0.002)      
-0.0008   
(0.002)     
0.004*    
(0.002)      
-0.0006   
(0.002)     
Foreign majority 
ownership 
-0.337 
(0.211)      
 0.338 
 (0.279)      
-0.197 
 (0.171)     
0.310    
(0.219)      
-0.252   
(0.177)     
0.336   
(0.256)      
Single 
establishment 
-0.465*** 
(0.165)      
0.072 
(0.154)      
-0.347*** 
 (0.118)     
0.138    
(0.125)      
-0.406***     
(0.140)     
0.119   
(0.139)      
       
Number of 
observations 
1,787 2,362 1,787 2,362 1,787 2,362 
Number of 
establishments 
787 1,003 787 1,003 787 1,003 
Number of failures 145 117 145 117 145 117 
Wald        67.01 
 
71.18 82.06 77.83 92.03 85.95 
AIC 
 
701.58 651.29 691.16 642.51 695.32 645.15 
Predicted median 
duration 
1.89 
 
2.58 
 
1.66 2.22 1.45 2.01 
 
Notes: These reported results are all in accelerated failure-time (AFT) form. In the Weibull case, to obtain a 
coefficient comparable with that generated by the Cox model one has simply to multiply the reported value by (-p), 
where p is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution. The results from the two models are directly comparable 
in their magnitude, sign, and statistical significance. (p is equal to 1.435501 (1.693232) in the first (second) column 
of the table). AIC denotes the Akaike information criterion. The (predicted) median duration given in the last row of 
the table is obtained using the corresponding distribution in a model without covariates. 
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TABLE 5 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimates, Restricted Sample of Permanent Establishments, 
2004-2008 
 Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees -0.241 (0.074)***  0.050 (0.237) 
Use of modern technology  0.150 (0.232)  0.447 (0.447) 
Proportion of skilled workers -0.002 (0.005)  0.007 (0.012) 
Proportion of female workers -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.009) 
Foreign majority ownership -0.788 (0.598)  0.434 (0.855) 
Single establishment  1.002 (0.303)*** -0.431 (0.486) 
Establishment age  0.072 (0.280) -0.694 (0.385)* 
   
Number of observations  3,928 3,051 
Number of establishments  821 627 
Number of failures  93 35 
Wald     76.89                                                  8,783.72                      
PH test (  )  12.96  11.82 
Note: See notes to Table 4.  
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TABLE 6 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimates, Restricted Sample of Permanent Establishments, 
2004-2008, Counterfactual 
 
 Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees -0.224 (0.074)***  0.055 (0.236) 
Use of modern technology  0.175 (0.234)  0.461 (0.445) 
Proportion of skilled workers -0.002 (0.005)  0.008 (0.012) 
Proportion of female workers -0.009 (0.005)* -0.0001 (0.009) 
Foreign majority ownership -0.810 (0.597)  0.492 (0.853) 
Single establishment  0.976 (0.305)*** -0.384 (0.478) 
Establishment age  0.123 (0.287) -0.763 (0.386)** 
   
Number of observations  4,163 3,551 
Number of establishments  868 727 
Number of failures  93 35 
Wald     75.45 28.22 
   
PH test (  )  13.08  11.97 
Notes: See notes to Table 4.The Wald test in the second column of the table does not reject the null of no joint 
statistical significance of the model. 
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TABLE 7 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model Estimates, Sample of Permanent Establishments, 2000-2008 
 
 Leaving any type of 
collective agreement 
Joining any type of collective 
agreement 
 
Log number of employees -0.367 (0.054)***  0.224 (0.122)** 
Use of modern technology  0.245 (0.165)  0.193 (0.272) 
Proportion of skilled workers -0.006 (0.003)**  0.0004 (0.005) 
Proportion of female workers -0.005 (0.003) -0.011 (0.006)** 
Foreign majority ownership -0.630 (0.422)  0.623 (0.462) 
Single establishment  0.648 (0.198)*** -0.337 (0.298) 
Establishment age -0.212 (0.169) 0.074 (0.247) 
   
Number of observations  7,486 5,697 
Number of establishments  922 675 
Number of failures  193 82 
Wald       147.56                                                  31.45
PH test (  )  32.25 13.43 
Note: See notes to Table 4. In the first column, the null hypothesis that the PH assumption holds is rejected. 
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FIGURE 1 
Schematic of the observation window and censoring 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend:  t – left-truncation point  
 c – right-censoring point 
 s – starting time of the event (or entry to a state) 
 e – ending time of the event (or exit from a state) 
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TABLE A.1 
Collective Bargaining Coverage by Employment and by Establishment, 2000-2008 (establishments with 
at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data, percentage values) 
 No Collective Agreement Firm-level Agreement Sectoral Agreement 
Year Region Employment Establishment Employment Establishment Employment Establishment 
 
2000 
Germany 34.3 48.9 7.0 2.8 58.7 48.3 
West 31.5 44.4 6.4 2.4 62.1 53.2 
East 48.4 67.2 9.9 4.5 41.7 28.3 
 
2001 
Germany 33.7 49.9 7.9 3.0 58.4 47.1 
West 30.8 45.7 6.9 2.4 62.4 52.0 
East 47.9 67.3 13.2 5.7 38.9 27.0 
 
2002 
Germany 34.7 51.5 7.6 2.6 57.7 45.8 
West 31.7 47.0 6.7 2.1 61.5 50.8 
East 50.2 70.8 11.9 4.8 37.9 24.4 
 
2003 
Germany 35.2 52.8 7.7 2.3 57.1 44.8 
West 32.1 48.1 7.1 1.9 60.8 50.0 
East 50.8 72.3 10.7 4.2 38.5 23.5 
 
2004 
Germany 36.9 56.0 7.6 2.4 55.5 41.6 
West 33.9 52.0 7.0 2.1 59.2 45.9 
East 52.3 72.9 10.8 3.7 36.9 23.4 
 
2005 
Germany 38.6 57.0 7.8 2.5 53.5 40.5 
West 36.1 53.6 7.2 2.3 56.7 44.1 
East 28.4 71.3 5.9 4.2 65.6 24.5 
 
2006 
Germany 40.3 58.7 8.0 2.3 51.7 38.9 
West 38.0 55.8 7.1 1.9 54.8 42.4 
East 52.2 71.8 12.2 4.5 35.6 23.7 
 
2007 
Germany 41.7 59.9 7.5 2.7 50.8 37.4 
West 39.5 57.0 6.6 2.1 53.9 40.9 
East 53.5 72.8 11.8 5.1 34.8 22.1 
 
2008 
Germany 42.8 60.8 8.0 2.8 49.2 36.4 
West 40.6 58.1 7.3 2.3 52.1 39.5 
East 54.4 71.9 11.3 4.5 34.3 23.6 
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TABLE A.2 
Collective Bargaining Coverage by Employment and by Establishment, 2000-2008, for Plants of 
Different Sizes (cross-section weighted data, percentage values) 
Germany No Collective Agreement Firm-level Agreement Sectoral Agreement 
Year Establishment size Employment Establishment Employment Establishment Employment Establishment 
 
2000 
With at least 250 11.2 17.0 12.8 12.3 76.0 70.7 
With less than 250 43.2 49.3 4.7 2.7 52.1 48.0 
 
2001 
With at least 250 10.7 15.5 15.9 14.0 73.4 70.5 
With less than 250 42.9 50.3 4.7 2.9 52.3 46.8 
 
2002 
With at least 250 10.8 15.9 14.5 13.5 74.6 70.6 
With less than 250 44.0 51.9 4.9 2.5 51.1 45.6 
 
2003 
With at least 250 11.7 16.6 15.6 13.1 72.7 70.3 
With less than 250 44.4 53.2 4.6 2.2 51.0 44.6 
 
2004 
With at least 250 11.0 16.2 14.0 14.1 75.0 69.8 
With less than 250 45.4 56.4 5.3 2.3 49.3 41.3 
 
2005 
With at least 250 12.2 17.2 14.0 14.0 73.8 68.9 
With less than 250 48.3 57.3 5.5 2.6 46.2 40.2 
 
2006 
With at least 250 13.3 20.3 15.8 14.3 70.8 65.4 
With less than 250 50.2 59.1 5.1 2.2 44.7 38.6 
 
2007 
With at least 250 15.3 21.6 13.2 13.1 71.5 65.3 
With less than 250 51.6 60.3 5.3 2.6 43.1 37.1 
 
2008 
With at least 250 17.7 24.7 14.7 13.1 67.6 62.2 
With less than 250 52.3 61.2 5.5 2.6 42.2 36.2 
West    
2000 
With at least 250 10.7 16.2 12.0 11.2 77.3 72.6 
With less than 250 40.4 44.8 4.0 2.2 55.6 53.0 
2001 
With at least 250 10.2 15.1 14.1 11.8 75.7 73.1 
With less than 250 39.7 46.0 3.7 2.3 56.6 51.7 
2002 
With at least 250 10.2 15.4 13.2 11.7 76.6 72.8 
With less than 250 40.8 47.4 4.0 2.0 55.2 50.6 
2003 
With at least 250 11.0 16.0 14.8 11.6 74.2 72.5 
With less than 250 41.1 48.5 3.8 1.8 55.1 49.7 
2004 
With at least 250 10.2 15.3 13.0 12.9 76.8 71.9 
With less than 250 43.6 52.4 4.5 2.0 51.9 45.6 
2005 
With at least 250 11.6 16.6 13.2 12.7 75.2 70.7 
With less than 250 45.8 53.9 4.9 2.2 49.4 43.8 
2006 
With at least 250 12.5 19.0 14.6 13.2 72.9 67.8 
With less than 250 48.1 56.2 4.2 1.7 47.7 42.1 
2007 
With at least 250 14.7 20.8 12.0 11.4 73.3 67.7 
With less than 250 49.6 57.4 4.5 2.0 45.9 40.6 
2008 
With at least 250 16.9 24.0 13.5 11.2 69.6 64.8 
With less than 250 50.3 58.5 4.8 2.2 44.9 39.2 
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(cont.) 
 
East No Collective Agreement Firm-level Agreement Sectoral Agreement 
Year Establishment size Employment Establishment Employment Establishment Employment Establishment 
2000 
With at least 250 15.8 23.2 20.3 20.3 63.9 56.5 
With less than 250 55.0 67.5 7.8 4.4 37.2 28.1 
2001 
With at least 250 13.8 18.1 29.4 27.3 56.8 54.6 
With less than 250 56.6 67.6 9.0 5.5 34.4 26.8 
2002 
With at least 250 15.6 19.0 25.1 24.7 59.3 56.3 
With less than 250 58.4 71.2 8.8 4.6 32.8 24.2 
2003 
With at least 250 17.0 20.6 21.5 22.3 61.5 57.1 
With less than 250 59.0 72.7 8.1 4.1 32.9 23.2 
2004 
With at least 250 17.7 21.8 21.9 21.8 60.4 56.4 
With less than 250 60.3 73.3 8.2 3.5 31.4 23.2 
2005 
With at least 250 16.9 20.8 21.4 22.4 61.6 56.8 
With less than 250 59.5 71.7 8.6 4.1 31.8 24.3 
2006 
With at least 250 20.0 28.1 25.1 20.8 54.9 51.0 
With less than 250 59.7 72.1 9.2 4.4 31.2 23.5 
2007 
With at least 250 20.6 26.5 22.7 23.3 56.6 50.2 
With less than 250 61.0 73.2 9.3 5.0 29.8 21.9 
2008 
With at least 250 24.4 29.5 24.3 26.0 51.3 44.5 
With less than 250 60.8 72.2 8.5 4.4 30.7 23.5 
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TABLE A.3 
Within versus Compositional Change by Type of Agreement and by Region, 2000 and 2008, 
2000 and 2004, and 2005 and 2008 (cross-section weighted data) 
  Germany West East 
(a) Collective agreements of any type, 2000-2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 
(1) Observed coverage rate 51.2 39.2 55.7 41.9 33.1 28.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 2000-2008  -12.0  -13.8  -5.0 
(3) 2008 (predicted) coverage based on 2000 
coefficients  
 51.0  55.5  34.1 
(4) 2000 (predicted) coverage based on 2008 
coefficients 
40.0  42.7  28.1  
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics based on 2000 coefficients 
 -0.2 
(1.5%) 
 -0.2 
(1.3%) 
 1.1 
(-21.9%) 
(6) Percentage point change due to changes in 
behavior based on 2000 coefficients  
 -11.9 
(98.5%) 
 -13.7 
(98.7%) 
 -6.1 
(121.9%) 
 (b) Collective agreements of any type, 2000-2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
(1) Observed coverage rate 51.2 45.0 55.7 49.1 33.1 27.6 
(2) Percentage point change, 2000-2004  -6.2  -6.6  -5.5 
(3) 2004 (predicted) coverage based on 2000 
coefficients  
 50.6  55.3  32.8 
(4) 2000 (predicted) coverage based on 2004 
coefficients 
45.4  49.3  28.4  
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics based on 2000 coefficients 
 -0.6 
(9.3%) 
 -0.4 
(6.1%) 
 -0.3 
(5.5%) 
(6) Percentage point change due to changes in 
behavior based on 2000 coefficients  
 -5.6 
(90.7%) 
 -6.2 
(93,9%) 
 -5.2 
(94.5%) 
 (c) Collective agreements of any type, 2005-2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 
(1) Observed coverage rate 43.0 39.2 46.3 41.9 28.9 28.1 
(2) Percentage point change, 2005-2008  -3.8  -4,4  -0.8 
(3) 2008 (predicted) coverage based on 2005 
coefficients  
 43.8  47.2  29.7 
(4) 2005 (predicted) coverage based on 2008 
coefficients 
38.6  41.1  27.8  
(5) Percentage point change due to changes in 
characteristics based on 2005 coefficients 
 0.8 
(-21.1%) 
 0.9 
(-20.4%) 
 0.8 
(-100.0%) 
(6) Percentage point change due to changes in 
behavior based on 2005 coefficients  
 -4.6 
(121.1%) 
 -5.3 
(120.4%) 
 -1.6 
(200.0%) 
Notes: The within effect is always statistically significant at the .01 level, while the between effect is never 
statistically significant. Taking the panel (a) results for illustrative purposes, the between effect in row (5) is given 
by row (3) minus row (1) for 2000, and the within effect in row (6) is given by row (2) minus row (5), or the 2000-
2008 percentage point change in row (2) minus the between effect. Alternatively put, if            is the 2008 
(predicted) coverage based on year 2000 coefficients, then the between effect is given by                     and 
the within effect by                   , where the reference groups are the year 2000 coefficients and the year 
2008 characteristics, respectively (see text). The results in panels (b) and (c) can be similarly interpreted. Our 
selected vector of covariates   includes establishment size, the proportion of skilled and female workers, and 
dummies for single-establishment status, foreign ownership, establishment age, state of technology, industry and 
region. 
